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Abstract
There is promising recent evidence that poverty-targeted social cash transfers have potential to 
improve maternal health outcomes, however questions remain surrounding design features 
responsible for impacts. In addition, virtually no evidence exists from the African region. This 
study explores the impact of Zambia’s Child Grant Program on a range of maternal health 
utilization outcomes using a randomized design and difference-in-differences multivariate 
regression from data collected over 24 months from 2010 to 2012. Results indicate that while there 
are no measurable program impacts among the main sample, there are heterogeneous impacts on 
skilled attendance at birth among a sample of women residing in households having better access 
to maternal health services. The latter result is particularly interesting because of the overall low 
level of healthcare availability in program areas suggesting dedicated program design or matching 
supply-side interventions may be necessary to leverage unconditional cash transfers in similar 
settings to impact maternal health.
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Nearly two decades have passed since the explosion of cash transfer programs made famous 
by the evaluation of the Government of Mexico’s Oportunidades (formerly Progresa) 
program, showing large impacts on a range of human capital and development outcomes. 
These programs, primarily in Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) countries, were typically 
targeted toward households with under five and school age children, and payments made 
conditional on completing certain co-responsibilities, such as child health check-ups or 
maintaining levels of school attendance. Now a mainstay of many government welfare 
portfolios, a ‘new generation’ of social cash transfer (SCT) schemes have emerged and are 
characterized by several distinct features. First, compared with LAC countries, the expansion 
has been largely into regions with weaker institutional structures, more widespread poverty 
and where government and institutional-run social safety nets have been historically absent 
and unreliable. For example, in the last five years, impact evaluations of approximately 14 
large-scale government programs have been commissioned in a range of African countries 
including South Africa, Kenya, Ghana, Malawi, Zimbabwe and Lesotho (Davis et al. 2012). 
Second, unlike LAC programs, the majority of SCTs in Africa are unconditional and often 
linked to geographic or vulnerability targeting (e.g. orphans and other vulnerable children, 
the disabled or the elderly). Third, both objective and impact evaluations have expanded to 
include diverse targets such as adolescent risk behaviors, reproductive and maternal health, 
productive activities and local economy ‘spillover’ effects. There is great interest by 
policymakers and practitioners on both the efficacy and efficiency of SCTs in targeting a 
broad range of development outcomes in these settings. The idea of just “giving money to 
the poor” so beneficiaries can make use of funds according to their own needs, has also 
gained political popularity (Hanlon 2004).
One area garnering the attention of researchers and policymakers is the potential of poverty-
targeted SCTs and related programs to affect maternal and neonatal health. Despite global 
improvements in maternal mortality, 20 developing countries show either increases or no 
progress in maternal mortality and only 22 of 137 developing countries are likely to achieve 
Millennium Goal Target 5 by 2015 (Lozano et al. 2011). Annual estimates report 
approximately 60 million women give birth outside health facilities and 52 million give birth 
without a skilled attendant (UNICEF 2008). There are multiple layers of demand and 
supply-side barriers to receiving adequate care, however program implementers and 
policymakers are increasingly seeking alternate and innovative methods of overcoming 
barriers. Although the evidence is promising from LAC evaluations that SCTs have the 
ability to improve maternal health, particularly healthcare utilization, there is a lack of 
consensus on which program design components may be responsible for impacts (Glassman 
et al. 2013). However, for maternal health indicators, there is no evidence of improvement 
particularly from the African continent using unconditional programming (Lagarde et al. 
2007). Part of the challenge in providing evidence is due to the fact that the majority of 
poverty targeted SCTs are not designed to impact maternal health specifically. Therefore, 
these indicators may not be collected, or when they are, sample sizes may be small, resulting 
in underpowered estimates or the inability to conduct rigorous analysis.
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This study uses evaluation data from the Zambian Child Grant Program (CGP), a large-scale 
government-run unconditional SCT given to women to evaluate the impact of income 
transfers on four maternal healthcare utilization outcomes: 1) antenatal care (from a doctor 
or nurse); 2) at least four antenatal visits; 3) quality of antenatal care (defined as receiving 
Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) for HIV, tetanus vaccination and malaria treatment 
during antenatal care); and 4) skilled attendance at birth (from a doctor or nurse). Although 
the CGP was not designed specifically to impact maternal health outcomes, there are several 
pathways through which a structural intervention could improve care. The analysis utilizes 
the randomized control trial (RCT) design and difference-in-difference (DID) multivariate 
regression analyses to identify causal impacts of income transfers over a 24-month period 
from 2010 to 2012. Results indicate no measurable program impacts for the full sample on 
any of the four outcome indicators. However, we found heterogeneous impacts on skilled 
attendance at birth among a sample of women residing in households with better access to 
maternal health services. Although there are a number of explanations for lack of robust 
significant impact, taken together, results indicate tailoring complementary services or 
matching supply-side interventions may be necessary to enhance the impact of unconditional 
poverty-targeted SCTs for maternal health. Policy and research implications are discussed in 
the context of the growing number of SCT programming and impact evaluations both 
globally and in Africa specifically.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1. Transfers and maternal health
There is growing interest in the ability of cash and other transfers to improve maternal 
health, as indicated by the increase in recent research and ongoing evaluations focused on 
these linkages around the world. In a recent systematic review of the impacts of conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programs on maternal and newborn health, Glassman and colleagues 
(2013) categorize evidence into “broad” and “narrow” programming. Broad programs 
include the typical large-scale poverty-targeted LAC CCTs with general poverty objectives, 
while narrow programming is designed to impact maternal health specifically, typically 
through voucher schemes or payments linked to behavior around the time of birth.
While it is not immediately obvious that “broad” CCTs would deliver impacts on maternal 
health, they include a set of design features allowing for the potential improvements in 
outcomes. The first and most obvious pathway is through an income effect. Households 
receiving transfers will on average have more disposable income, which can be used to 
purchase healthcare, including buying medicine, paying health facility fees or purchasing 
transportation to distant health facilities. If transfers are given to women specifically, the 
program increases bargaining power or otherwise empowers women and a larger share of the 
disposable income may be spent on women-specific goods. If transfers result in greater food 
security, dietary diversity and better health or nutrition of the households in general, 
maternal-specific health may also improve. Programs with conditions or monthly trainings 
for participants may include antenatal or postnatal visits as part of the household co-
responsibilities, or stimulate demand for healthcare through health or nutrition trainings (de 
Brauw and Peterman 2011). In addition, many programs include supply-side incentives such 
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as the removal of user fees for health services or the increase in the supply of health services 
through investment in infrastructure.
Despite these promising features, traditional CCTs have not always been successful in 
inducing a measurable impact on maternal health or service utilization. For example, 
evaluations of Oportunidades using a RCT design and study sample size of 840 to 892 
births, found increases in quality of antenatal visits, however no impact on use of antenatal 
care, number of visits or type of facility visited (Barber 2009; Barber and Gertler 2008). 
Further, quasi-experimental evidence from El Salvador’s Communidades Solidarias Rurales 
similarly showed no impact on antenatal care service utilization using samples of 
approximately 494 births (de Brauw and Peterman 2011). However, evidence from Uruguay 
and Guatemala are slightly more promising. Using program administrative micro-data 
matched to longitudinal vital statistics, Amarante and colleagues (2012) found that 
participation in the unconditional cash transfer Plan de Atencion Nacional a la Emergencia 
Social (PANES) resulted in significantly more total antenatal visits (albeit a small effect size, 
equal to approximately two percent of the baseline average), however no impact on the week 
of the first visit (N = 67,863). Finally, a quasi-experimental evaluation of Guatemala’s Mi 
Familia Progresa found that among 1,163 women, there were significant increases in the 
total number of antenatal visits (only among the non-indigenous sample, five to eight 
percentage points), as well as antenatal attendance at a health facility (11 percentage point 
increase) for their last birth (Gutierrez et al. 2011).
Evidence on outcomes more proximate to birth are also mixed. One analysis of the 
Oportunidades RCT found little or no impact on skilled attendance at birth among rural 
women (Urquieta-Salomon et al. 2009), however results are in contrast to those using more 
recent data, where younger cohorts of Mexican women (aged 15 to 19 and 20 to 24 years) 
had 88 percent and 41 percent greater likelihood of choosing a physician or nurse as 
compared to traditional midwife for childbirth (Sosa-Rubi et al. 2011). Results from El 
Salvador show significant impacts on rates of births in hospitals and birth attendance by 
doctors and nurses (de Brauw and Peterman 2011), however there are no significant impacts 
on these outcomes in Uruguay (Amarante et al. 2012). In Guatemala, impacts on skilled 
attendance at birth are mixed, depending on what subgroup of women were being examined 
(Gutierrez et al. 2011).
The second strand of literature, referred to as the “narrow” programs, examines dedicated 
maternal health voucher schemes and other maternal-health specific supply or demand side 
incentives, primarily in Asia. In India, Lim and colleagues (2010) evaluate the Janani 
Suraksha Yojana program, a one-time cash incentive to induce women to give birth in 
facilities using a quasi-experimental design. Utilizing nationwide district-level household 
survey data, results indicate the program had a positive impact on completion of three 
antenatal care visits, in-facility births or out-of-facility births with a skilled attendant, and in 
some models, a reduction of neonatal and perinatal deaths, but no effect on maternal 
mortality. However, the authors note targeting challenges and quality of healthcare as 
restricting factors in both program implementation and evaluation.1 Small but significant 
positive impacts were also found in a quasi-experimental evaluation from the Safe Delivery 
Incentive Program in Nepal, a nation-wide program designed specifically to increase skilled 
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attendance at birth through a variety of incentives to women (cash transfer to compensate for 
travel to clinics at the time of birth and free delivery care) and to providers (cash transfer for 
every delivery attended). However, similarly, authors note key constraints in program 
delivery, including institutional capacity and weak health services (Powell-Jackson et al. 
2009a; Powell-Jackson et al. 2009b). Finally, increases in use of antenatal care (22 
percentage point increase), postnatal care (35 percentage point increase) and institutional 
delivery (22 percentage point increase) were found to be associated with purchase of a 
voucher booklet ($50 equivalent) in an evaluation of the Dera Ghazi Khan maternal health 
voucher scheme in Pakistan (Agha, 2011). However, the study was not designed as 
experimental and thus there are some limits both to methodology and to geographical 
representation necessitating further validation.
In summary, although promising evidence exists for CCTs (and SCTs in general) in affecting 
maternal health, particularly around healthcare utilization at the time of birth, questions 
remain surrounding design features responsible for impacts (Glassman et al. 2013). In 
addition, although dedicated voucher schemes have demonstrated positive impacts, 
evaluation and institutional limitations have been cited across studies and no cost-
effectiveness assessments exist. Many of the current evaluations suffer from small sample 
sizes and the inability to control for important factors such as service facility data, thus are 
not able to clearly articulate which casual pathway is leading to, or lacking in determining 
impacts. None of the seven studies reviewed by Glassman and colleagues (2013) with 
antenatal indicators, nor the six studies reviewed with skilled attendance at birth come from 
Africa. Therefore, there is interest not only in how program dynamics play out in a very 
different context such as Zambia, but also how large-scale unconditional programs may 
perform in affecting similar indicators to those studied in more traditional CCT programs.
2.2 The Zambian Child Grant Program
The CGP is a large-scale social safety net owned by the Zambian Government and operated 
by the Zambian Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health 
(MCDMCH). The CGP was initiated in 2010 with the overall goal of reducing extreme 
poverty and curbing the intergenerational transfer of poverty. The CGP currently operates in 
Kalabo, Shangombo and Kaputa districts which represent the districts with the highest rates 
of mortality, morbidity, stunting and wasting among children aged zero to five years. In 
eligible areas, the program transfers a fixed sum of 60 Zambian kwacha (ZMW) rebased 
(approximately US $12) on a bi-monthly basis to the primary female adult in households 
with a child under the age of three at program initiation. Recipients are universally targeted 
within the geographical areas selected for the program. There is a continuous enrollment 
system, in which households were immediately enrolled after having a newborn baby. The 
transfer amount is expected to be sufficient to purchase food equivalent to one meal per day 
for all household members and is distributed through a local pay-point manager. The specific 
objectives of the program are to: 1) supplement, not replace, household income; 2) increase 
the number of children enrolled in and attending primary school; 3) reduce the rate of 
1In addition, other scholars have called for need of further research to confirm these findings, both generally, as well as to specifically 
examine contextual factors contributing to program impact (Das and Roa 2011; Khan et al. 2010).
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mortality and morbidity among children under 5 years old; 4) reduce stunting and wasting 
among children under 5 years old; 5) increase the number of households owning assets such 
as livestock; and 6) increase the number of households that have a second meal a day. 
Results of the 24 month follow-up evaluation report show that the CGP was largely 
successful at meeting poverty-related targets, with significant impacts on reducing extreme 
poverty and increasing food security, consumption, dietary diversity, asset ownership and 
productive activities, material well-being of older age-group children, as well as stimulating 
the local economy (AIR, 2013). As previously noted, the CGP was not designed to 
specifically impact maternal health outcomes, although there are several pathways through 
which impacts could occur, particularly through an income effect and through empowerment 
of women who receive cash.
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
The CGP evaluation was commissioned by the Government of Zambia and is part of the 
Transfer Project, a consortium of international research partners and civil society partnering 
with national governments to support improved knowledge and practice on SCT in Africa.2 
A baseline survey among a random sample of 2,515 beneficiary and non-beneficiary 
households was carried out in October to November of 2010 and a longitudinal follow-up 
survey was conducted 24 months later in October to November of 2012. The baseline 
sample includes 14,565 individuals, of whom 4,793 are under the age of five, split evenly 
among 90 randomly assigned treatment and comparison clusters (45 in each arm). The 
sample size was powered to detect effects for child anthropometry using the smallest 
analysis subgroup (children under age five) and accounting for attrition and nonresponse 
rates. The survey contained detailed modules on socioeconomic status, wealth and 
production activities, early childhood development, women’s empowerment and collected 
anthropometry for all children under five. A module was administered collecting birth-
specific information on and matching to mothers or primary caregivers for all children born 
up to five years prior to the baseline or during the program period. In addition, community-
level and health-facility level surveys were collected to account for access to services and 
infrastructure. Questionnaires, reports and further information are publicly available on the 
Transfer Project website. The study underwent ethnics review at AIR in Washington, D.C. 
and through the University of Zambia in Lusaka.
3.2 Methodology
The CGP evaluation is designed as an RCT, taking advantage of the government’s planned 
rollout of the program, with the unit of randomization at the Community Welfare Assistance 
Committee (CWAC), the lowest level of program administration. CWACs were randomly 
assigned to either treatment (starting the program in December 2010) or delayed-entry 
(starting the program at the end of 2013). The latter group serves as the comparison for the 
purpose of evaluation. The randomization was conducted by the Ministry in collaboration 
with the research team after the baseline survey had been administered, both to ensure 
2The Transfer Project Website: http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/transfer [7 November 2013].
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transparency and unbiased implementation of data collection. The randomized, longitudinal 
design of the evaluation allows estimation of the program impact as the difference in the 
change in health utilization outcomes from baseline to follow-up of treatment women in 
comparison to the change in health utilization outcomes of similar control women. The 
specific notation for the DID estimator is the following:
(1)
where E[I1] – E[I0] is the change in health care utilization outcome of interest, for example 
skilled attendance at birth, for the treatment group from baseline to follow-up, and E[C1] – 
E[C0] is the change in skilled attendance at birth for the control group from baseline to 
follow-up. The DID estimator provides an unbiased estimate of the treatment effect under 
the assumption that in the absence of the treatment, outcomes in the two groups would have 
followed similar trends. Further, an analysis of community prices and shocks found no 
significant differences across treatment and control CWACs during the study period (AIR, 
2013). Since the program is designed as an unconditional transfer, the DID can be taken as 
measuring a pure income effect of the program, rather than capturing additional supply-side 
or learning effects from health information trainings.
In a multivariate regression framework, the DID estimator can be calculated with the 
following equation:
(2)
where Y is the outcome of interest at baseline or follow-up, T is the time trend equal to 1 if 
the observation is in the follow-up, and CGP is an indicator for whether the household is in 
the treatment group, and β3 is coefficient for the interaction term between the two, or the 
DID intent to treat estimator. In other words, β3 represents the amount of change in 
outcome, Y, which is attributable to the intervention. In equation 2, X is a vector of baseline 
covariates and βx is a vector of coefficients that correspond to each covariate. Theoretically, 
with random assignment, the inclusion of baseline controls is not necessary to obtain 
unbiased estimates of β3 3 However, to increase the precision of the estimates and control 
for any minor differences between treatment and comparison arms at baseline, models 
including covariates will be presented in the Appendix. Control variables included in 
equation 2 are at the individual level (age and age squared in years of mother/primary 
caregiver, highest grade of education of mother/primary caregiver, indicators for mother/
primary caregivers marital status), household level (household size, distance to nearest food 
market) and the health facility level (distance to nearest health facility, index of service 
availability of maternal health care) and a vector of community level prices of staple foods in 
ZMW (maize grain, rice, beans, dried fish, sugar, salt, soap and panadol, a common form of 
pain medication). The index of service availability is constructed through factor analysis 
3In particular the success of randomization of the CGP evaluation sample has been demonstrated through balancing of general 
household socio-economic indicators (Seidenfeld and Handa, 2011; AIR, 2013).
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containing indicators that the cluster health facility offers: 1) obstetric care, 2) antenatal 
care, 3) tetanus vaccination, 4) VCT, 5) malaria tests, 6) pregnancy tests, 7) family planning 
and 8) mobile clinics. The scale reliability between these indicators is high (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.91). Descriptive statistics for all control variables including those contributing to 
the health service availability index are included stratified by treatment and control in 
Appendix Table A1. Equation 2 is estimated using linear probability models (LMPs)4 and in 
all regressions, district-level dummy variables are included and standard errors are clustered 
at the level of randomization (CWAC-level).5
3.3 Sample and key indicators
The information for the maternal health care utilization indicators comes from a module 
collecting data on every child living in the household aged zero to 60 months and links to the 
biological mother or primary caregiver from the household roster. The sample for analysis 
includes information on pregnancies for children born at least 15 months prior to the 
baseline or follow-up survey. This cut point ensures that pregnancies are only included in the 
sample if by the follow-up women were participating in the program for the entire nine 
months of the pregnancy.6 The resulting sample is 1,155 births in the baseline (580 control 
and 575 treatment) and 559 births in the follow-up (288 control and 271 treatment). The 
reduced sample in the follow-up is reflective of the initial program enrollment requirement 
of a child under the age of five for households, which by the follow-up would have aged out 
of the birth cohort examined. We examine four outcomes: 1) antenatal care from qualified 
health practitioner (doctor or nurse), 2) at least four antenatal visits during pregnancy, 3) 
quality of antenatal care (defined as receiving VCT for HIV, tetanus vaccination and malaria 
treatment during antenatal care), and 4) skilled attendance at birth (doctor or nurse).7 
Outcome 2 follows the recommended number of visits as outlined by the WHO and all 
measures are self-reported. Births are included in the sample regardless of whether the 
woman appears in both the baseline and follow-up surveys.8
3.4 Attrition analysis
In virtually all analysis of longitudinal data, we may be concerned about attrition over the 
panel period and how this may bias results. Attrition analysis in the 24-month impact report 
for the CGP shows that attrition is approximately nine percent, however finds no differential 
attrition between treatment and control with respect to basic demographic and socio-
4We also estimate probit models with the same specifications, however find qualitatively identical results, and therefore prefer LMP 
specifications for simplicity of interpretation.
5Contamination between treatment and control clusters is one threat to internal validity. This could occur if a control cluster household 
mistakenly ended up on a beneficiary list for a neighboring treatment cluster, or if a treatment cluster household subsequently moved 
into a control cluster and was misclassified as a non-beneficiary. Tracking protocol specified that if any household moved to another 
study cluster, they would be tracked and retained in the evaluation sample as their original cluster treatment status. To examine 
potential contamination, we identify the number of households in control areas who have ever received the transfer at follow-up and 
find that 35 households out of 1,145 (~3%) control cluster households report having ever received the transfer, and 32 households 
report current receipt of the transfer. This indicates that there is likely little contamination between treatment and control clusters.
6Results are robust to cut points at 14 months and 16 months.
7We do not analyze any antenatal care utilization (whether or not from a skilled practitioner), as virtually the entire sample reports at 
least one visit. We conduct robustness checks by analyzing each quality of care indicator separately for the main analysis, and similar 
to the combined indicator, find no significant impacts by individual indicator.
8We also run parallel analysis at the household level, using household-level averages for outcomes and characteristics of the CGP 
transfer recipient for socio-demographic indicators specific to the mother/caregiver, however find qualitatively similar results and thus 
present only individual level analysis here.
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economic indicators (AIR, 2013). In the current analysis, we may be concerned about 
multiple types of attrition. First, we may be concerned about household level attrition, which 
may be primarily poverty or mobility related. Second, we may be concerned about potential 
bias where certain households are more likely to have births due to demographics or other 
unobserved factors. To examine these differences, we first look at mean differences in the 
household level averages between cross-sectional and panel households, and conduct t-tests 
to determine if there are significant differences (Appendix Table AI). Results show that 
although outcome variables are on average equal between panel and cross-sectional 
households, mothers or caregivers in cross-sectional households are more likely to be 
younger, widowed and live in larger households. These attrition differences are a threat to 
the internal validity of the estimates only if attrition is differential by treatment status. AIR 
(2013) shows that attrition is balanced between treatment and control arms, which is 
similarly the case for the pregnancy subsample (p-value = 0.927).
4. RESULTS
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Table I shows descriptive results by treatment status for the baseline (top panel) and the 
follow-up (bottom panel) across the four outcome indicators. The last column reports mean 
differences and significance levels between treatment and control. In the baseline, overall 
approximately 73 percent of births report antenatal care from a doctor or nurse and 63 
percent of births have received at least the four recommended visits. In addition, 77 percent 
of the sample has met all the quality of care indicators, however, only 36 percent of births in 
the baseline are attended by a doctor or nurse. Of the four outcomes, skilled attendance at 
delivery is the only indicator with statistically significant differences between the treatment 
and control groups in the baseline, where the treatment group reports a lower percentage 
with skilled attendance in comparison to the control group (31 percent versus 41 percent). 
The bottom panel shows there have been few trends in the receipt of skilled antenatal care or 
completing four visits. Quality of antenatal care has improved among the sample as a whole 
(91 percent), with slightly larger increases in the treatment group. Finally, skilled attendance 
at birth increases slightly in the overall sample (from 36 percent to 38 percent), driven by 
increases in the treatment group.
The baseline statistics across all indicators are very similar in magnitude to the most recent 
Zambian Demographic and Health Survey (ZDHS) in 2007, which collected information on 
births over the five years prior to the survey. According to the ZDHS, antenatal care is nearly 
universal (97 percent), 59 percent of the births in the sample complete at least the 
recommended four visits and 42 percent of births were attended by a doctor or nurse (CSO 
et al. 2009).
Appendix AII presents descriptive indicators for control variables utilized in regression 
analysis as well as differences between treatment and control samples. On average mothers 
or primary caregivers are 28 years old and have completed four years of education. The 
majority of mothers or primary caregivers are in a union or marriage, while approximately 
four percent are widows, eight percent are divorced and 13 percent have never been married. 
The average number of household members is just over six people and the sample is split 
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equally between the three pilot districts. There are no significant differences in any of the 
control variables across treatment status.
4.2 Impact results
Table II presents the unadjusted impact estimates across all four outcomes with sample sizes 
and R squared values reported at the bottom of the table. Results show that there are no 
significant program impacts across all indicators.9 Robustness checks including covariates 
show virtually no changes from the unadjusted results, although program impact coefficient 
for skilled attendance approaches weak positive significance. The adjusted results are 
reported in Table AIII.
4.3 Heterogeneous impacts
Following previous literature finds program impacts of transfers among subgroups, we 
conduct sensitivity analysis to see if there are potential heterogeneous impacts of the CGP 
transfer. There are a number of reasons we may expect heterogeneous impacts of the 
transfer. If the transfer works to empower women or give them greater bargaining power, 
there is a possibility a greater proportion of the income could be allocated to women-specific 
goods and services. We test this pathway through interacting the program treatment effect 
with mother or primary caregivers education and mother’s age, both proxies for bargaining 
power. In addition, to test if supply-side considerations are a constraint in healthcare 
utilization outcomes, we interact the program treatment effect with the index of health 
services as well as the distance to the nearest health facility. The remaining specifications of 
the regression analysis, including covariates are unchanged from the main equation 2. The 
heterogeneous results are reported in Table III, displayed similarly to results from the main 
analysis. Findings indicate that across all antenatal outcomes there is no evidence of 
significant heterogeneous impacts. However, for skilled attendance at birth, women who 
have access to better health services in their community are more likely to give birth with a 
doctor or nurse (both significant at the 1% level). In addition, when interaction terms are 
added, the program impact coefficient for both receipt of any skilled antenatal care (coeff: 
0.383, t-stat: 2.40) and quality of antenatal care (coeff: 0.238, t-stat: 1.87) approach or 
become significant. This appears to be driven by interactions with mother or caregiver’s age, 
which are weakly significant and negative. This indicates the program may have a larger 
impact on younger mothers or caregivers in the sample as compared to older mothers or 
caregivers, however these results should be taken as suggestive, as the interaction terms are 
significant only at the p<0.10 level.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Using a large-sample RCT, we evaluate the impact of the CGP, an unconditional SCT 
program on a range of antenatal care indicators and skilled attendance at birth. We find no 
measurable program impacts for the full sample on any outcome indicators. We believe this 
is the first rigorous large-scale evaluation of an unconditional SCT on maternal healthcare 
9The 95% Confidence Intervals (CI) for the coefficients reported in Table II are as follows: 1) Skilled antenatal care (CI: −0.117 
−0.164), 2) Four antenatal care visits (CI: −0.226 – 0.0290, 3) Quality of antenatal care (CI: −0.092 – 0.074), Skilled attendance at 
birth (CI: −0.036 – 0.180).
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indicators and the first of any type of cash transfer program in Africa. However, since the 
CGP was not designed with the objective of affecting maternal health, this lack of program 
impact cannot be seen as a failure of the program to meet its stated objectives. This lack of 
measurable effect may also be an artifact of the program location, as the three districts are in 
rural areas with high levels of poverty and food insecurity and with low access to and with 
poor quality health facilities. Thus if supply-side constraints are binding, even if increased 
income may have stimulated demand for healthcare, because there were no increases in 
supply of services, there may be a limit on the observable program impact. Indeed, 
consistent with this hypothesis we find heterogeneous impacts for skilled attendance at birth 
among a sample of women residing in households having better access to maternal health 
services. We find no evidence that women who have greater bargaining power as proxied by 
age and higher education are better able to leverage resources for use for their health care. 
This mirrors findings from the main evaluation indicating no measurable effects of the CGP 
were found on women’s household decision-making power (AIR 2013). Thus, at least in the 
case of skilled attendance at delivery, access to healthcare services appears to be key to 
leveraging additional cash inflows to achieve better service utilization, suggesting that 
tailoring complementary services or matching supply-side interventions can enhance the 
impact of unconditional poverty-targeted SCTs for maternal health in similar settings.
There are a number of important policy lessons learned from these results. First, our findings 
underscore the importance of quality service provision in improving utilization of antenatal 
care and skilled delivery at birth, either implemented jointly or independently of transfer 
programs. The Government of Zambia has made efforts to improve maternal healthcare in 
the last decade through dedicated programming, including the removal of user fees and 
addressing supply-side bottlenecks. However, according to the DHS, using direct sisterhood 
method estimates, Zambia’s maternal mortality ratio (MMR) increased from 646 to 729 
deaths per 100,000 live births between 1996 and 2002, and showed only modest decreases in 
2007 to 591 deaths per 100,000 live births, making it one of the highest in the world 
(Zambian Central Statistics Office et al. 2003, 2009).10 Thus, there is need for more 
dedicated funding or innovative programming in order to increase service quality and 
coverage for maternal health.
If SCTs are specifically aimed at maternal or neonatal health, considerations could also be 
given to how programs might seek to actively empower or increase bargaining power of 
women, or increase spending on gender-friendly goods. For example, several CCTs in Africa 
(Eritrea, Mozambique and Senegal) have built in maternal health related conditions, aimed at 
directly incentivizing and prioritizing use of the transfer on maternal health (Glassman et al. 
2013). However, such initiatives must carefully consider the context of the intervention, in 
particular the availability of health services and ensure that the transfer is large enough to 
offset the additional private cost of conditions (Jones et al. 2011). For example, in extreme 
resource-poor settings, transfers could be offered in conjunction with demand-side 
10Although Zambia is rated by the World Health Organization as making “insufficient progress” in reductions, the small numbers of 
maternal deaths, and hence the large confidence intervals associated with these estimates make it difficult to assess trends. For 
example, Zambia’s 2007 MMR 95 percent confidence interval is 450–752 (Zambian Central Statistics Office et al. 2009, pp. 324). 
Confidence intervals for the previous estimates were not calculated.
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financing, health insurance schemes focused on obstetric care, or in areas where supply-side 
programming (results-based financing and other health system initiatives) are also operating 
(Jones et al. 2011; Sharan et al. 2010).
There are important limitations to the analysis. First, all outcome and control indicators are 
self-reported, and thus subject to recall and other biases. In addition, global positioning 
surveillance (GPS) information for the health facility data was not gathered, thus for those 
clusters without a facility in the community, no linkage can be made to a more complex 
measure which would take into account the relative distance to the next closest service point. 
Finally, we acknowledge that the evaluation was not powered on maternal health indicators, 
and was instead based on child anthropometry indicators. However, we can provide some 
robustness checks on the expected size of average change in our outcomes based on 
simulated increases in expenditure. To do this, we calculate the relationship between per 
capita expenditure and our maternal health outcomes using the baseline data. We simulate 
the effect of a universal increase of a 0.33 standard deviations in average expenditure, or the 
approximate amount of the transfer, similar to the methodology used in Seidenfeld and 
Handa (2011) to predict program impacts. We find virtually no increases in our outcome 
indicators, and in fact, the only indicator which significantly improves with the expenditure 
quintile is skilled attendance at birth. This evidence suggests wealthier households in our 
sample are not using additional cash to buy more maternal health, which is consistent with 
our findings and suggestion more than just an income effect is needed to induce greater 
maternal healthcare utilization.
In conclusion, it is important to highlight research lessons to apply to future similar 
evaluations for SCTs and dedicated maternal health voucher or incentive schemes such as 
those currently underway in Afghanistan, Bolivia, Malawi and the Philippines (Chavez 
2010; Fernandez and Olfindo 2011; Glassman et al. 2013). The first lesson, particularly for 
SCTs without a maternal health focus is to plan for sample sizes sufficient to analyze 
maternal health outcomes and conduct robust analyses, which will vary by setting depending 
on research design and underlying prevalence of indicators in the study population. If 
attention is not paid to this in the early design stages, lack of impact may be attributed to 
small sample sizes. Since publication bias will favor significant impacts, lack of publication 
when no impacts are found may lead to a false sense of overall effectiveness of transfers in 
improving health. Second, there is need for standardization of measures, moving beyond 
service utilization to healthcare outcomes (birth weight, neonatal mortality, maternal 
mortality and morbidities) as well as quality of services received (Glassman et al. 2013). It is 
also crucial to measures supply-side and access issues, to understand how they link to care 
utilization and to demonstrate casual pathways through which outcomes are realized. These 
may be collected in dedicated facility surveys, or as perceptions/knowledge of services and 
distance to access points in household survey questionnaires. In some cases, if government 
monitoring and facility data is of high quality and at a low level of aggregation, these data 
can be matched to evaluation data using GPS data or other methods. This is particularly 
important in the case of dedicated schemes where there may be supply-side improvements to 
health infrastructure as part of the program. Finally, there is a lack of cost-effectiveness 
analysis on measured impacts to assess trade-offs and potential synergies in delivering 
benefits to mothers, children and households in resource-poor settings. Given the volume of 
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forthcoming research on this topic, future publications should prioritize comparisons and 
policy recommendations by typology of program, recognizing that incentives, 
conditionalities and program objectives are likely to play a large role in the potential of 
programs to improve maternal health and healthcare utilization.
Supplementary Material
Refer to Web version on PubMed Central for supplementary material.
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Table I
Baseline and follow-up means for antenatal care and skilled attendance outcomes by Child Grant Program 
treatment status
Baseline All Control Treatment Difference
Received antenatal care from doctor or nurse 0.73 (0.01) 0.74 (0.02) 0.71 (0.02) −0.04 (0.03)
At least four antenatal care visits 0.63 (0.01) 0.64 (0.02) 0.63 (0.02) −0.02 (0.03)
Quality of antenatal care 0.77 (0.01) 0.76 (0.02) 0.79 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Birth attended by doctor or nurse 0.36 (0.01) 0.41 (0.02) 0.31 (0.02) −0.10 (0.03)**
N 1,155 580 575
Follow-up All Control Treatment Difference
Received antenatal care from doctor or nurse 0.72 (0.02) 0.73 (0.03) 0.72 (0.03) −0.02 (0.04)
At least four antenatal care visits 0.64 (0.02) 0.69 (0.03) 0.59 (0.03) −0.11 (0.04)*
Quality of antenatal care 0.91 (0.01) 0.89 (0.02) 0.92 (0.02) 0.01 (0.03)
Birth attended by doctor or nurse 0.38 (0.02) 0.39 (0.03) 0.36 (0.03) −0.03 (0.04)
N 559 288 271





Sample includes all births in households taking place 15 months prior to baseline and follow-up surveys. Quality of antenatal care is an indicator of 
having received Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV, tetanus vaccination and malaria prevention during antenatal care.
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Table II
Unadjusted regression results of the Child Grant Program on antenatal care and skilled attendance at birth
Skilled antenatal care Four antenatal visits Quality of antenatal care Skilled birth attendance
Program impact (DID) 0.023 (0.33) −0.098 (1.53) −0.009 (0.21) 0.072 (1.32)
CGP participant −0.048 (1.05) −0.014 (0.32) 0.022 (0.76) −0.096 (1.75)
Time (24 month follow-up = 1) −0.063 (1.46) 0.025 (0.49) 0.083 (2.85)** −0.021 (0.64)
Shangombo district 0.082 (2.02)* 0.014 (0.31) −0.103 (3.83)** −0.183 (3.11)**
Kaputa district −0.150 (2.45)* 0.100 (2.38)* −0.140 (5.02)** −0.180 (2.50)*
Constant 0.764 (17.54)** 0.591 (13.77)** 0.833 (37.66)** 0.530 (8.76)**
R2 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04
N 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,714





Sample includes all births in households taking place 15 months prior to baseline and follow-up surveys. Quality of antenatal care is an indicator of 
having received Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV, tetanus vaccination and malaria prevention during antenatal care.
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Table III
Adjusted regression results of the impact of Child Grant Program on antenatal care and skilled attendance at 
birth with interactions
Skilled antenatal Four antenatal visits Quality of 
antenatal care
Skilled birth attendance
Program impact (DID) 0.383 (2.40)* −0.139 (0.81) 0.238 (1.87) 0.047 (0.27)
Mother/caregiver grade completed * 
Program impact
−0.001 (0.07) −0.000 (0.03) −0.009 (1.17) 0.008 (0.83)
Mother/caregiver highest grade completed 0.003 (0.83) 0.002 (0.68) 0.005 (1.42) 0.013 (3.05)**
Mother/caregiver age (years) * Program 
impact
−0.008 (1.73) −0.003 (0.72) −0.007 (1.77) −0.002 (0.29)
Mother/caregiver age (years) 0.006 (0.86) 0.013 (1.69) 0.019 (2.72)** 0.000 (0.01)
Index of health services in cluster * 
Program impact
0.035 (0.70) 0.031 (0.60) −0.012 (0.31) 0.114 (3.09)**
Index of health services in cluster 0.005 (0.30) 0.062 (4.11)** 0.016 (0.93) 0.027 (1.19)
Log distance to nearest health facility * 
Program impact
−0.076 (1.78) 0.065 (1.69) −0.008 (0.31) 0.029 (0.82)
Log of distance to nearest health facility 0.022 (1.18) −0.025 (1.20) 0.007 (0.43) −0.036 (1.83)
CGP participant −0.027 (0.61) 0.002 (0.06) 0.019 (0.67) −0.086 (1.76)
Time (24 month follow-up = 1) −0.066 (1.57) 0.023 (0.45) 0.083 (2.72)** −0.007 (0.22)
Shangombo district −0.008 (0.15) −0.041 (0.88) −0.127 (3.84)** −0.280 (4.85)**
Kaputa district −0.165 (2.88)** 0.086 (2.12)* −0.130 (3.43)** −0.218 (3.30)**
Constant 1.012 (5.81)** 0.388 (2.30)* 0.667 (4.32)** 0.901 (4.70)**
R2 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.12
N 1,787 1,787 1,787 1,714





Sample includes all births in households taking place 15 months prior to baseline and follow-up surveys. Quality of antenatal care is an indicator of 
having received Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV, tetanus vaccination and malaria prevention during antenatal care. Health services index 
is constructed through factor analysis containing indicators that the cluster health facility offers obstetric care, ANC, carries tetanus vaccines, offers 
VCT, malaria tests, pregnancy test, family planning and has a mobile clinic. All models control for additional socioeconomic characteristics found 
in Table AII including a vector of cluster level prices.
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